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In the Room Where it Happens: Including the 
“Public’s Will” in Judicial Review of Agency Action 
by Twinette L. Johnson 
INTRODUCTION 
In the popular Broadway musical play Hamilton, there is a 
scene where Aaron Burr learns he was not privy to a dinner 
conversation that transpired amongst Alexander Hamilton, 
Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison.1  During this dinner, the 
three (Madison, Jefferson, and Hamilton) agreed on a 
compromise that would make what is now Washington, D.C., 
the nation’s capital, and which would allow the federal 
government to tax the states.2  When Burr hears of this 
compromise, he knows he has been left out of the conversation 
on these matters.3  To lament being left out, Burr begins to sing 
a song decrying not just his absence from “the room where it 
happens,”4 but also alluding to the fact that no one really knows 
what happens in the room.5  Burr says, “No one really knows 
how the game is played[,] [t]he art of the trade, [h]ow the 
   Professor of Law and Director of Academic Success Programs, University of the 
District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law.  I would like to thank the editors of 
the Arkansas Law Review for inviting me to their Symposium, Hiding in Plain Sight: What 
Education Reform Needs, my fellow symposium participants for their attentive ears and 
thoughtful comments, and the symposium attendees for their helpful questions and 
reactions to my presentation on this topic; my fellow panelists at the Association of 
American Law Schools Discussion Panel entitled The Role of Law in Educational 
(In)Equality for allowing me the opportunity to present and discuss the ideas associated 
with this article; and my research assistant, Kwebena Owusu-Koduah for his assistance in 
conducting the research for this essay. 
1. See Lin-Manuel Miranda, In the Room Where it Happens, in Hamilton: An




5. See id. 
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sausage gets made[,] [w]e just assume that it happens[,] [b]ut no 
one else is in[,] the room where it happens.”6 
In the context of higher education reform, the people need 
to be in the important rooms where the decisions are being 
made. One such room is the courtroom.  This essay elaborates 
on this premise, previously written about in an article I wrote 
entitled, 50,000 Voices Can’t Be Wrong, But Courts Might Be: 
How Chevron’s Existence Contributes to Retrenching the 
Higher Education Act.7  That article was the second in a series 
of three articles on the retrenchment of the Higher Education 
Act of 1965 (“HEA”) using the William Eskridge and John 
Ferejohn statutory entrenchment model.8  It argues that 
Chevron’s 9 deference to agency action works to undermine the 
historical policy of the HEA because it prevents courts from 
considering the people’s will when reviewing agency action.10  
To support the inclusion of the people’s will, the article critiques 
the standard mechanisms for ensuring the people’s participation 
and collaboration in agency decision and rule-making.11  This 
essay continues to urge a rethinking of deference schemes as 
applied to agency decision-making and rule promulgation when 
an entrenched super statute like the HEA is at issue.12  But, it 
does so through the lens of historic and current judicial 
philosophies regarding a court’s role in shaping the law.  Using 
6. Miranda, supra note 2. 
7. Twinette L. Johnson, 50,000 Voices Can’t Be Wrong, But Courts Might Be: How 
Chevron’s Existence Contributes to Retrenching the Higher Education Act, 103 KY. L.J. 
605, 606 (2014-15) [hereinafter Johnson, Voices]. 
8. Other articles in the series are Twinette L. Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing
Board: Re-Entrenching the Higher Education Act to Restore Its Historical Policy of 
Access, 45 TOL. L. REV. 545, 549–50 (2014) [hereinafter Johnson, Going Back to the 
Drawing Board (describing the historical policy of the Higher Education Act and arguing 
that political machinations are obfuscating the real issues associated with higher education 
reform) and Twinette L. Johnson, Reimagining Accountability: A Move Toward Re-
Entrenching the Higher Education Act, 28 U. FLA. J. L. PUB. POL’Y 35, 42–43 (2017) 
[hereinafter Johnson, Reimagining Accountability] (arguing for a move from pure 
accountability assessment schemes to a combination of accountability and performance-
based assessment to preserve the policy of wide-spread access associated with the Higher 
Education Act).  These articles will be referenced for background information. 
9. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
10. Johnson, Voices, supra note 8, at 610.
11. See id. at 624–33 for a discussion on why participation and collaboration by the 
people in the administrative rule-making process does not preclude a separate assessment 
of the people’s will  when reviewing agency action.  
12. See id. at 611. 
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jurisprudence as the context, this essay attempts to justify 
including the people’s will at all levels of judicial review of 
agency action. 
Thus, to create a place for the people’s will in the 
courtroom, two things must happen.  First, judicial deference to 
agency decision-making and rule promulgation must be 
reimagined and re-conceptualized such that courts seek out and 
take notice of the sociological impact of agency action.13  
Second, the measure of sociological impact must be treated as 
more than mere opinion, but rather as reliable statements of the 
people’s will that courts consider when reviewing agency 
action.14 
Judicial deference to agency action must be reimagined and 
reconceptualized where agency action directly impacts 
provisions that have become engrained in societal expectation 
and necessary for societal well-being.  One such societal 
provision is the opportunity to attain a post-secondary 
credential.  The HEA15 was promulgated with just that in 
mind.16  The HEA’s undergirding policy supports wide-spread 
access to higher education such that the people have the 
opportunity to earn a credential that will assist them in becoming 
fully functioning members of society.17  It is thus necessary to 
consider whether deference is appropriate when courts review 
Department of Education (“DOE”) action that impacts society in 
ways that do not align with the  legislation’s policy. 
Courts often employ deference schemes when considering 
agency action.  The policy behind taking such an approach is 
13. See id. at 609–10. 
14. Contra Tracey E. Robinson, By Popular Demand? The Supreme Court’s Use of 
Public Opinion Polls in Atkins v. Virginia, 14 GEO. MASON C.R. L.J. 107, 134–35 (2004) 
(describing polls as unreliable in measuring public opinion due to inconsistent use and 
questionable scientific methods).   
15. Higher Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §1001 (2016).
16. Erica R. Dines, The Higher Education Act of 1965, THE THIN TWEED LINE,
(Mar. 17, 2012), http://humanstudy.org/category/higher-education-law/; see Johnson, 
Going Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 9, at 552 (stating that the HEA “sought to 
bridge the economic gap for citizens stuck in a revolving cycle and hereditary legacy of 
poverty by providing the means to pursue higher education”). 
17. Dines, supra note 17 (stating that “[t]he HEA was an important piece of 
legislation which, by providing financial assistance to under-privileged individuals, 
increased the opportunity for previously unattainable education, leading to the betterment 
of society”). 
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generally rooted in two main premises.  One premise is that 
Congress, in creating the agency and enacting the law the 
agency is to administer, has the ultimate authority to determine 
the nature and extent of an agency’s action.18  Congress, 
however, cedes much of the day-to-day administration of the 
law to the agency.19  This transfer of authority confirms the 
second premise, that the agency has the superior expertise to 
administer the law through its decisions and promulgations.20  
With these two foundational  premises at work, courts then 
review agency action using deference schemes best encapsulated 
in the Chevron case.21  Generally, Chevron deference operates 
on the predetermined belief that as long as the agency is 
operating under the general statutory guidelines set by Congress 
in the enacting legislation and according to its expertise, agency 
action should receive deference.22  While seemingly logical in 
theory, in practice, Chevron deference creates a “mechanical 
jurisprudence,”23 and a move away from the “study of the 
sociological factors that underlie law.”24  In accepting deference 
18. See McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J. 
OF L., ECON., & ORGS., 180, 184 (1999) (stating that delegating to agencies allows 
Congress to write simpler statutes). 
19. Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive 
Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 253, 256 (1986). 
20. See McNollgast, supra note 19, at 184. However, that delegation creates both
agency and political drift.  Agency drift can occur when the agency acts outside its 
statutory agenda and is out of control.  Id.  Political drift can occur when elected officials 
can influence the agency to adopt policies not in line with the policy agreement of the 
enacting parties.  Id. 
21. See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984). 
22. See id. at 842–43.  The Chevron doctrine encompasses two steps.  Id.  First the 
courts determine whether Congress has, through its statute’s language, spoken clearly 
regarding the agency action at issue.  Id. at 842.  Only if Congressional intent is unclear is 
there a need to move on to the second step, which determines whether the agency action is 
based on a permissible construction of the statute under which it gets its power.  Id. at 842–
43. If Congressional language is silent or ambiguous with respect to the issue, the court
will defer to the agency’s interpretation if it is reasonable analysis.  Id. 
23. Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Wielding the Double-edged Sword: Charles Hamilton 
Houston and Judicial Activism in the Age of Legal Realism, 14 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 
17, 28 (1998) (a tribute to Charles Hamilton Houston) (describing “mechanical 
jurisprudence” as a “mode of legal thought canonized by Classical Legal Thinkers  . . .”).  
Fairfax also credits Roscoe Pound for authoring the phrase.  Id. at 28–29 (citing Roscoe 
Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 605 (1908)).   
24. See id. at 29 (recognizing the sociological school of jurisprudence’s approach to 
making the law as one that “should not be derived through supposed universal and 
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to agency decision-making and rule promulgation as it currently 
stands, the judiciary has in essence divested itself from a critical 
role: to facilitate the discussion and normative debate necessary 
to ensure that laws ensconcing little “r” rights (such as 
education) not guaranteed by the constitution, but codified and 
sustained over time, continue to serve the purpose for which 
they were originally enacted.25 
The administration of education at post-secondary levels is 
an essential pathway to full and meaningful participation in 
society.26  However, education and the way it is provided in the 
United States has long been under attack.  Ideals associated with 
education as the  great equalizer are not being realized as 
society’s composition and needs change.  A growing immigrant 
population, as well as a minority population, that are perpetually 
underrepresented in almost all facets of society signal clearly 
that the ideals associated with education have not been 
realized.27  In fact, long established policy towards creating 
educational opportunities to those historically denied 
educational access are being retrenched.28  Education, conceived 
almost as a public good, is being economized through 
axiomatic first principles, but rather through a study of the sociological factors that 
underlie the law”).   
25. Johnson, Reimagining Accountability, supra note 9, at 44 (describing “a super
statute as recognize[ing] a right, not granted by the Constitution, but claimed by citizens as 
necessary and vital to fully functioning in society). Further, “[s]uper legislative enactments 
[such as the HEA] . . . become entrenched as citizens reclaim the rights granted by those 
enactments over and over again by pushing [] lawmakers to revisit [them] as the public’s 
needs shift and adjust over time.”  Id. 
26. Dines, supra note 17.
27. See Jeanne Batalova and Elijah Alperin, Immigrants in the U.S. States with the 
Fastest-Growing Foreign-Born Populations, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE: MIGRATION 
INFORMATION SOURCE (July 10, 2018), 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/immigrants-us-states-fastest-growing-foreign-
born-populations https://perma.cc/D4UY-DBGX (“[T]he Census  Bureau projects that net 
international migration will be the main driver behind U.S. population growth between 
2027 and 2038.”); see generally More Hispanics Are Going to College and Graduating, 
But Disparity Persists, PBS NEWS HOUR (May 14, 2018, 4:53 PM) [hereinafter, PBS 
NEWS], https://www.pbs.org/ newshour/education/ more-hispanics-are-going-to-college-
and-graduating-but-disparity-persists [https://perma.cc/3PR3-YDDX] (explaining that 
while there has been an increase in the Hispanic college population, there remains a divide 
between White and Hispanic students in term of six and for year graduation rates which 
leave many Hispanics in lower paying jobs). 
28. See Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 9, at 562–75, for a 
discussion on the retrenchment of the HEA. 
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commodification and marketization.29  This has led to an 
increase in oversight which has simultaneously caused a 
decrease in quality.30  These happenings are proof that the 
democratic process (touting participation and collaboration in 
making and administering the law) does not work as it should 
when groups affected are subject to prejudice.31  In such 
instances, the court must step in to ensure that the democratic 
process works as it should.32  Thus, courts should play a critical 
role in ensuring that the education provision and the historical 
policy undergirding it are not lost through political machinations 
and reform proxies that obfuscate the real issues affecting 
them.33 
Additionally, views of sociological impact regarding 
agency action as ranking inferior to interpretations of 
congressional intent and agency expertise must be rethought.  At 
the turn of the century and during the rise of the industrial 
complex, the courts and the nation at large where in a 
contentious debate about the role of the judiciary in making 
law.34  This time was marked by a seminal case – Lochner v. 
New York35 where the United States Supreme Court famously 
struck down legislation that would limit employees’ work 
hours.36  While the principles supporting the disposition of the 
Lochner case were eventually overturned,37 the case stands as an 
29. See generally Osamudia R. James, Predatory Ed: The Conflict Between Public 
Good and For-Profit Higher Education, 38 J.C. & U.L. 45 (2011), for a discussion on the 
difficulty in administering the education provision when it is conflated with market-based 
distribution. 
30. See generally Johnson, Reimagining Accountability, supra note 9, for a critique 
of the impact of numbers-based accountability assessment schemes in determining whether 
schools are meeting their obligations in providing meaningful access to higher education 
opportunities. 
31. David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251, 
1257–58 (2010); see also Johnson, Voices,  supra note 8, at 624–33, for a critique of the 
participation and collaboration aspects of rulemaking. 
32. See Strauss, supra note 32, at 1258.
33. Id. at 1257.
34. Barry Friedman, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 167 (2009) (describing the turn 
of the century as a period of “popular clamor about judicial review”). 
35. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
36. Id. at 64 (rejecting a New York law imposing limits on workplace hours based 
on freedom of contract). 
37. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 380 (1937).  In West Coast, the 
Supreme Court upheld a Washington state law requiring minimum wages for women as not 
violating the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Id. at 392.  The Court rejected the 
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example of the judicial philosophy that guided courts’ review of 
the social legislation of the time –  a philosophy rooted in 
promoting the interest of wealthy owners of industry and not 
those who were being exploited by it.38  Professor Barry 
Freidman describes the era as one in which “the courts used the 
Constitution as a basis for invalidating laws enacted by popular 
legislative bodies . . . [in] hundreds and hundreds of adjudicated 
disputes in the state and federal courts.”39 
The people’s rejection of the Lochner era approach to 
judicial review has had stymying effects on judges’ ability to 
look outside the language of the law when reviewing agency 
action.  During the Lochner era, judges routinely struck down 
social legislation that would assist the working class in 
establishing suitable working conditions.40  This legislation, 
enacted by elected lawmakers, was routinely considered 
unconstitutional and thus rejected by the judiciary.41  This essay 
does not suggest a return to the Lochner era when judges used 
constitutional originalism as a proxy for striking legislation that 
did not align with their own personal and economic self-
interests.42  Rather, this essay suggests that the judicial activism 
of the Lochner era be rethought to form a new judicial 
philosophy – one that combines courts’ willingness to look 
outside of the law when reviewing agency action and to 
argument that the state law was unconstitutional because it was rooted in freedom of all 
parties to contract.  Id. at 392.  The Court stated that there was no “absolute and 
uncontrollable liberty” recognized by the Constitution.  Id.  The Court explained that “the 
liberty safeguarded is the liberty in social organization which requires the protection of law 
against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals[,] and welfare of the people.”  Id. 
at 391; see Alex McBride, Supreme Court History: Capitalism and Conflict, THIRTEEN 
MEDIA WITH IMPACT (Dec. 2006), 
https://www.thirteen.org/wnet/supremecourt/capitalism/landmark _westcoast.html 
[https://perma.cc/D3RD-Y6HB] (describing West Coast as ending Lochner era 
jurisprudence, as well as describing other landmark cases of the era).  
38. Fairfax, supra note 24, at 32; (stating that judges, during the turn of the century 
industrial revolution period, routinely struck down progressive legislation favoring the 
lower and working classes).   
39. Friedman, supra note 35, at 173 (comparing other periods of judiciary
controversy as being evidenced by “one or a handful of cases provoking heated debate” 
and the Lochner era as involving “hundreds and hundreds” of such cases). 
40. Id. at 167–68. 
41. Fairfax, supra note 24, at 32.
42. Id.
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recognize and search out sociological impact when doing so.43  
This will not result in a return to the Lochner era judicial 
activism of the industrial revolution, but will be  more akin to 
the “social engineering” advanced by Charles Hamilton 
Houston.44  Houston described social engineering as using the 
law and “‘ whatever science demonstrates . . .  both to foster and 
to order social change for a more humane society.’”45  This 
jurisprudence takes into account the people and their will – the 
social and economic norms that encompass the people’s 
preferences for, beliefs on, and desires for access to those things 
that would make them better societal members.46 
This essay will discuss the importance of courts’ 
considering the people’s will when reviewing agency decision-
making and rule promulgation.  In doing so, Part I will explore 
the reason for including the people’s will in judicial decision-
making.  The goal of this section is to position the people’s will 
as an integral part of judicial review of agency action.  This 
section will also reinforce the importance of the people’s will in 
maintaining entrenched super statutes, such as the HEA, which 
seek to preserve, over time, rights deemed essential to societal 
well-being.  Part II will discuss what should comprise the 
people’s will.  The purpose of this section is to recognize and 
legitimate the vast information regarding the people’s 
preferences, beliefs, and desires generated by a social movement 
and its participants in terms of defining the people’s will.  Part 
III of this essay will generally explore how existing legal 
constructs might be expanded to allow the people’s will into the 
courtroom in a meaningful and sustained way.  The goal of this 
section is to consider ways in which the people’s will can be 
elevated from opinion to information deemed critical when 
reviewing agency decision-making’s and rule promulgation’s 
impact on society. 
43. Id. at 26 (quoting Charles Hamilton Houston’s jurisprudential philosophy of 
using the courts to socially engineer change); “The best way to . . .  involve the court in 
interpretive exercises beyond purely language and dictionary battles is to create a deference 
exception for entrenched super statutes.”  Johnson, Voices, supra note 8, at 634 (citing 
Robert Choo, Judicial Review of Negotiated Rulemaking: Should Chevron Deference 
Apply?, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 1069, 1083 (2000). 
44. Fairfax, supra note 24, at 26.
45. Id. 
46. Johnson, Voices, supra note 8, at 614.
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I. WHY INCLUDE THE PEOPLE’S WILL IN THE
COURTROOM? 
That the people’s will be considered is important when 
reviewing agency action under a statute such as the HEA.  The 
HEA was promulgated in 1965 after research and study 
confirmed that access to post-secondary education was crucial to 
personal, societal, and economic survival.47  “[T]he Act sought 
to elevate post-secondary education as the means by which 
citizens could lift themselves up from and remain out of 
poverty.”48  The key to understanding the historical policy 
behind the Act is recognizing how it came about: through 
activism.49  With regard to education, the people, through their 
lived experiences and the capture of those experiences in data 
and studies, set out to demand access to that which would assist 
them in fully realizing their potential as full members of 
society.50  Armed with this information, the people advocated, 
through demonstrations, protests, writings and other mediums, 
for access to a post-secondary credential that would ensure 
meaningful participation and thus existence in society.51  In 
response, Congress enacted ground-breaking education 
legislation addressing education, at all levels, including post-
secondary access.52 
The way in which the HEA came about, as well as its 
continued existence since its inception, positions it as more than 
47. Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 9, at 576.
48. Johnson, Voices, supra note 8, at 606.
49. See Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements, 
111 MICH. L. REV. 877, 881 (2013) (describing social movements, in the context of 
creating constitutional law, as “influenc[ing] public opinion in their favor [and] changing 
the culture with which  constitutional law interacts”); see generally David Cole, ENGINES 
OF LIBERTY: THE POWER OF CITIZEN ACTIVISTS TO MAKE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2016), 
for a historical description of important legal changes and arguing that they occurred 
because of a systemic citizen activist approach to changing the hearts of and minds of 
society who thus demanded that the change be reflected in the law. 
50. Dines, supra note 17.
51. See Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 9 at 546–58, for a 
discussion on the social advocacy associated with the HEA. 
52. Id. at 608 (citing Robert Dallek, FLAWED GIANT: LYNDON JOHNSON AND 
HIS TIMES, 1961-1973, 79 (1998)). 
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an ordinary statute, but a super statute.53  It is one of those 
statutes that can be labeled “super” using William Eskridge and 
John Ferejohn’s entrenchment model.54  Under this model, 
Eskridge and Ferejohn posit that super statutes represent a 
“statutory constitutionalism . . .  [that has grown] out of social 
movement demands that government . . . regulate private as well 
as public institutions.”55 Statutes such as the HEA thus operate 
more like constitutional gap fillers entrenching within society an 
expectation of a certain right to and supplying a provision for 
higher education that is not granted under the Constitution.56  
The statute thus becomes entrenched and achieves “super” status 
as society continues to advocate for it by highlighting how the 
statute provides benefits and rights society has come to rely 
on.57  It is this advocacy, by the public, that brings about the 
statute’s existence and that sustains it over time.58  The Eskridge 
and Ferejohn entrenchment model encompasses this advocacy as 
part of the normative debate that all stakeholders (the people, the 
legislature, and the judiciary) participate in as the statute 
develops into one that represents the will the people.59  When 
the judicial review process does not recognize the people’s 
societal and economic goals as part of its understanding of the 
law’s purpose, it stymies the normative debate process and 
potentially produces results that are out of line with the people’s 
will.  The people’s activism provides both the foundation and 
continuing purpose for super statutes such as the HEA.  Thus, 
this activism cannot be eschewed by the courts when 
stakeholders seek the court’s guidance in determining whether 
subsequent laws are in alignment. 
53. Johnson, Voices, supra note 8, at 612–13 (statutes become “super” through the 
entrenchment process as the statute changes, through the normative debate process, to meet 
the needs of the people). 
54. Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 9, at 550–51 (citing
William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1217 (2001)). 
55. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF NEW STATUTES: 
THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 121 (2010). 
56. Johnson, supra note 8, at 606.
57. Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 9, at 547.
58. Id.
59. Johnson, Voices, supra note 8, at 606 (citing ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 
57, at 121). 
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A. Deference Creates a Barrier to Including the
People’s Will in the Judiciary’s Review of Agency 
Action 
The historical policy undergirding the HEA (wide-spread 
post-secondary access to traditionally underrepresented people) 
cannot be achieved without reimagining the process of 
reviewing, monitoring, and even sheparding laws designed to 
provide rights that are pivotal in equipping an ever-changing 
public with what it needs to participate fully in society.60  As 
long as the undergirding policy is intact that the people have 
meaningful opportunity to attain  a post-secondary credential 
that will make them better able to function in society review of 
agency action regarding that policy must consider the social and 
economic norms of the people.61 
In a failed attempt to reform the Lochner judiciary which 
frequently struck down progressive social legislation meant to 
help the poor and working classes during the Industrial 
Revolution, President Theodore Roosevelt criticized the Court 
describing it as “a power which may give one man or three men 
or five men the right to nullify the wishes of the enormous 
majority of their ninety million fellow-citizens.”62  While 
President Roosevelt’s motives may have been slightly different 
from those expressed here, the “concern” for the power of the 
judiciary and how it is used is consistent.  The power of the 
court is not in nullification or “mechanical jurisprudence” that 
works to meet the needs of political constituents instead of the 
needs of the people.63  Rather, it is the power the judiciary has as 
full participants in the democratic process of shaping the law for 
the good of the people.64  This is not a move toward the judicial 
activism of the past where jurists sought to review and interpret 
the law with their own social and economic realities at the 
forefront, but rather judicial social activism in the same vein as 
60. Dines, supra note 17.
61. See Freidman, supra note 35, at 167 (describing the sentiment of the President
and Progressives, who decried much of courts actions in rejecting legislation meant to 
defend the working class against being victimized by “corporate corruption of politics and 
the social injustices that were the product of America’s industrial revolution”). 
62. Id. 
63. Fairfax, supra note 24, at 29.
64. Id. at 28–29. 
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Charles Hamilton Houston’s social engineering jurisprudence 
that requires knowledge of the realities of human social life.65 
Although courts have recognized sociological impact in 
many high-profile cases, the initial concern remains.66  Are the 
people (their preferences, beliefs, and desires), in the rooms 
where these decisions are happening?  When courts rely on 
Chevron deference when reviewing and interpreting agency 
action with respect to the HEA, is the people’s will left out?67  
Chevron reduces interpretation to dictionary battles in many 
instances and sets a standard that favors agency action 
presenting an almost insurmountable burden to those who would 
challenge.68 
Even though members of society who have been 
historically underrepresented in post-secondary institutions are 
attending college in record numbers, they are still unable to 
achieve the same level of employment and thus pay as their 
white counterparts.69  Deference should not hide this critical 
information.When agencies act and stakeholders appear in 
courts to address agency action, courts should recognize that the 
very presence of the parties before a decision-making tribunal 
signals a possible breakdown in the administration and/or 
operation of the law.  While this essay does not argue for a 
particular outcome in these instances, it does argue for a 
particular approach: one that considers how the law in question 
affects the very people it was designed to serve. 
Under the Chevron deference construct, the people’s will is 
too easily discarded.  Chevron deference is premised, in part, on 
the belief that the agency has superior expertise on the given 
issue.70  When this belief is coupled with a legislative 
interpretive scheme that is essentially limited to text of the 
statute, courts create a powerful impediment to including the 
people’s will in its review of agency decision-making and rule 
65. Id. 
66. See Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the 
Constitution: The Case of the New Departure, SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27, 27–28 (2005), for a 
list of famous social movements that changed constitutional law. 
67. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984). 
68. Choo, supra note 44, at 1083.
69. PBS NEWS, supra note 28.
70. Johnson, Voices, supra note 8, at 635; McNollgast, supra note 19, at 184.
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promulgation.71  This approach ultimately leaves the people out 
of the courtroom as the judiciary uses Chevron deference to 
rubber stamp what the agency does instead of looking at agency 
action through the lens of the people’s needs. 
B. Judges Must Become More “Active” in
Incorporating the People’s Will in its Review of Agency 
Action 
By the turn of the century, the United States had entered its 
Industrial Revolution.72  Cities were bursting with new industry 
rooted in mass production of goods.73  As the public’s appetite 
grew for these mass-produced goods, so too did the industrial 
complex which would provide them.74  Large factories and the 
mass production machines they housed became the de rigeur 
business model in major cities.75  What also became common 
were the many workers needed to operate these factory 
machines many of whom were immigrants.76  While these 
immigrants came to America looking for an opportunity to 
better themselves and become full members of American 
society, they were met with long hours, dangerous working 
conditions, child labor exploitation, and inadequate pay in the 
work place.77 
Progressive politicians enacted legislation that would 
address and ease these workplace issues.78  Even though this 
legislation was seen as representing the people’s will since the 
people elected these politicians, courts routinely rejected it. 
Courts rejected this social legislation that was meant to level the 
position of the workers with that of the corporate elite who 
owned the factories.79  The people elected members of the 
Progressive Party with the expectation that their elected officials 
71. McNollgast, supra note 19, at 184.
72. See Myron Marty, Twentieth Century: Society in the United States, SCHOLASTIC,
https://www.scholastic.com/teachers/articles/teaching-content/ twentieth-century-society-
united-states/ [https://perma.cc/X9T2-4GDN] (last visited Mar. 14, 2019). 
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id. 
76. Friedman, supra note 35, at 168–69 
77. Id. at 169. 
78. Id. at 170. 
79. Id. at 173. 
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would enact legislation that would protect them from the 
workplace ills that proliferated in the industrial complex.80  The 
courts, however, repeatedly rejected the progressive social 
legislation that addressed wages, hours, working conditions, and 
other work place associated issues, citing their interpretation of 
the Constitution as support.81  The people became increasingly 
frustrated with the judiciary’s approach to reviewing laws they 
saw as essential to their health and economic well-being.82  
What was supposed to be review was essentially nullification 
which systematically “trump[ed] the will of the majority.”83  
This period of judicial activism became known as the Lochner 
era.84  It was named after Lochner v. New York,85 a case in 
which the United States Supreme Court struck a state law  that 
would have limited the number of hours employees could work 
in a day.86  In Lochner, the Court held that the statute limiting 
work hours was unconstitutional as it violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment, according to the Court’s interpretation.87  The 
Court, based on its interpretation of the freedom of parties to 
contract, said that the state law impinged on that freedom by 
interfering with what should essentially be an agreement 
between employer and employee.88  The Court held the such an 
infringement violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.89  Lochner represented a jurisprudence where 
judges were active in imposing their opinion based on their own 
ideals and constituency under the guise of constitutional 
originalism.90 
Dissatisfied with the judicial activist approach, political 
figures, members of the legal academy, and even members of 
80. See id. at 170 (describing the various laws enacted to protect workers and ensure 
their wellbeing, including laws regarding income tax, child labor protection, and work 
place safety, hours, and conditions). 
81. See Friedman, supra note 35 at 171.
82. See id. at 169, 177.
83. See id. at 168. 
84. See id. at 167. 
85. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45.
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 53. 
88. Id. at 57-58. 
89. Id. at 53. 
90. Corey Rayburn Yung, Flexing Judicial Muscle: An Empirical Study of Judicial 
Activism in the Federal Courts, 105 NW. U. L. REV., 1, 12 (2011). 
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the judiciary stood up against the Lochner era judges and their 
consistent  rejection of any legislation set to help the poor and 
working class.91  The Lochner era judicial decisions also sparked 
new social movements and invigorated existing ones in the fight 
against these types of rulings.92  The Lochner era rulings thus 
gave rise to Legal Realism as a jurisprudence.93  Legal Realism 
was built on a foundation of viewing the law and the legislature 
enacting it as the supreme source of law.94  William Eskridge 
described Legal Realism as a movement which had pioneers 
“not just of the Harvard and Princeton trained intellectuals, 
but . . . also lawyers and leaders of social movements whose 
members’ interests were not represented” in the original 
constitutional interpretive jurisprudence perpetuated by the 
Lochner era courts.95  Legal Realism was thus born out of 
grassroots advocacy aimed at stopping courts from nullifying the 
people’s will by rejecting popular social legislation of the time.96 
While conceived to preserve progressive legislative 
enactments geared toward assisting the people, Legal Realism 
took a subversive turn as courts took a hands-off approach in the 
form of deference.  What was meant be an end to judicial 
activism  translated, over time, into a mechanical approach to 
judicial review.97  Courts, in an effort to completely exclude 
their opinion, did not disturb legislation at all.98  This  translated 
into a rigid deference that courts favored the legislature with. 
91. Friedman, supra note 35, at 188-91; but see id. at 168 (stating that because 
opinion polling barely existed at the time, it is impossible to know whether Lochnerera 
decisions truly trumped the people’s will). 
92. Friedman, supra note 35, at 191.
93. Id.; Fairfax, supra note 24, at 30.
94. Fairfax, supra note 24, at 32 (stating that Legal Realism placed “. . . the 
legislature and administrative agencies . . . [and] not the courts . . . [as] the rightful social 
and economic policy makers”). 
95. William Eskridge, Some Effects of the Identity-Based Social Movements on the 
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2355 (2002). 
96. Fairfax, supra note 24, at 31 (Legal Realism was the result of “law professors,
judges, and attorneys” simultaneously taking an interest in jurisprudence and seeking more 
humane conditions for society). 
97. See id., supra note 24, at 32; see generally McNollgast, supra note 19, at 193 
(describing the departure from substantial judicial involvement regarding review of 
legislation and increased reliance on the law-making body as a move to prevent political 
drift).  
98. See Fairfax, supra note 24, at 32.
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And that favor, over time, has extended to agency decision and 
rule-making in the form of Chevron deference. 
This approach is inappropriate in situations where the 
issues are based on a legislative enactment that operates to 
provide rights that the public has come to rely on to fully 
function in society.  Today, the  operating law associated with 
entrenched super statutory enactments, often comes in the form 
of agency decisions and rules.99  These decisions and rule 
promulgations, undertaken to administer the statute on a day to 
day basis, must also be reviewed by the judiciary with the 
people’s will in mind.  Yet, Chevron deference has the effect of 
blocking the people’s will in much the same way that Lochner-
era courts blocked popular legislation under the guise of 
constitutional interpretation.100  Lochner judges summarily 
struck down social legislation based on constitutional 
interpretations favoring freedom of contract.101  Judges invoking 
Chevron deference rubber stamp agency action based on 
congressional supremacy and agency expertise.102  Both 
approaches ignore the people’s will in the review process.  Legal 
Realism closed the door to the judicial activism of the Lochner 
era.  But, in doing so, it also closed the door to any active 
participation by judiciary.  Chevron has only compounded this 
by supporting the position that judges should not play a role in 
shaping and guiding the law.  This approach must change.  The 
judiciary must instead be an integral participant in the process of 
judicial review as it “. . . respond[s] to and advance[s] changes 
emanating from outside the courts. . ..”103 
Some would argue that the people are represented in 
agency action through their electing power and ability to 
participate in agency negotiated rule-making and notice and 
comment aspects of rule promulgation.  However, these 
seemingly democratic means of including the people are 
threatened by political machinations that obfuscate the real 
99. Morrison, supra note 20, at 256.
100. See generally id. at 261 (stating that while the Administrative and Procedural 
Act’s purpose “. . . was to protect regulated parties from precipitous agency action . . . [,]” 
there was little to no concern regarding “the intended beneficiaries . . .” of the regulation). 
101. Lochner, 198 U.S.  at 53.
102. See McNollgast, supra note 19, at 184.
103. NeJaime, supra note 50, at 882-83 (“constitutional change is a bottom-up
process in which courts are not leading, but instead are responding to external changes.”). 
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issues to manipulate the public.104  “Elections offer citizens the 
opportunity to assess [conditions], demand changes, and to hear 
from politicians how those demands might be met.”105  But there 
are always serious questions as to whether all demographics can 
participate or are “elitely stimulated” enough to know about 
opportunities for participation.106 
Judges are not meant to insert their own opinions and yet 
they cannot be automatons in reviewing agency action.  Instead, 
they must be active in considering the times, the people who live 
in the times, and the effect that agency decisions and rules will 
have on the people’s ability to fully function in society.107 
II. CAPTURING THE PEOPLE’S WILL?
The “people’s will” refers to social and economic norms 
that encompass the people’s preferences for assistance in 
achieving certain goals, beliefs on a given problem or issue, and 
desires for access to those things that would make them better 
societal members.108  The people’s will can be captured through 
any number of devices, including the history related to how the 
statute at issue came about and what policy emerged to support 
and sustain it.109  The people’s will can also be captured through 
data collection, polls and surveys, and sociological impact 
studies.110 
104. Strauss, supra note 32, at 1258 (stating that there are groups that are not able to 
play their proper role in the democratic process and when this happens, courts have a role 
to play because the self-correcting democratic processes – such as freedom of contract, 
elections, other participatory and collaborative mechanisms – will be nullified leaving only 
the court to make the democratic process work). 
105. Johnson, Voices, supra note 8, at 615.  See id. at 614-18 for a discussion of the 
issues related with solely relying on elections and the administrative process as an 
indication that the law reflects the people’s will. 
106. Id. at 626.
107. See Friedman, supra note 35, at 187 (describing the public’s lack of faith in the 
law as judges routinely interpreted the Constitution as mandating that they strike down 
legislation that reflected the will of the people). 
108. Johnson, Voices, supra note 8, at 614.
109. Id. at 618-20, 622.
110. Id. at 618-19.
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A. Social Movement History Should Be Included as Part
of a Court’s Interpretive Instrumentalities When
Reviewing Agency Action 
Social movement history would explain why the law was 
originally enacted in terms of what societal needs it attempted to 
meet.  It would simultaneously prioritize the impetus for 
creating the law and serve as an overarching mission statement 
or goal in reviewing the administration of the law over time. 
Understanding and evidencing the public’s support for a statute 
and its undergirding purpose is a crucial aspect of judicial 
review of agency action regarding an entrenched super 
statute.111 
In the Eskridge and Ferejohn super statutory entrenchment 
model, a statute gains its super status and becomes entrenched 
because the statute has expanded and contracted over time to 
meet the needs of the people through the normative debate 
process that includes all stakeholders.112  “Claims . . . thought 
unthinkable become reasonable . . . because of the ways . . . 
social movement activism shapes popular and elite 
understandings of the [people and what they value].”113 
The women’s suffragist movement serves as an example of 
how a social movement, particularly one resulting in super 
statutory enactment that becomes entrenched over time (such as 
the HEA), can influence law making.114  The central focus of the 
women’s suffragist movement, developed over time, was to 
111. See Michael L. Wells, Sociological Legitimacy in Supreme Court Opinions, 64 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1011, 1030-31 (2007) (stating that the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People’s approach to end segregation through litigation  
emphasized its rank of sociological legitimacy over moral legitimacy).  Id.  ([“N]o matter 
how strong one’s moral and legal arguments, without sufficient public support, an effort to 
vindicate them might nonetheless fail.”); NeJaime, supra note 50, at 882 (stating that “. . . 
new constitutional meaning becomes authoritative not because a court decided so 
independently, but because social movements have persuaded political forces, opinion 
leaders, the public, and judges that a new position is reasonable and , in fact, correct”).   
112. Johnson, Voices, supra note 8, at 612-13 (citing Eskridge and Ferejohn, supra
note 56, at 13 (stating that statutes are entrenched in terms of accepted norms and practices 
and because the entrenchment represents . . . “a popular consensus that the norm or practice 
is a good thing to believe or do”). 
113. NeJaime, supra note 50, at 883.
114. See Eskridge, supra note 97, 2355-56 for a description of the women’s
suffragist movement which was devoted to securing a Constitutional amendment that 
would allow women to vote.  
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secure an amendment to the Constitution which would guarantee 
the right to vote for women.115  This essay focuses on the 
inclusion of social movement history in the judicial review 
process when agency action relating to an entrenched super 
statutory enactment is at issue.  While different, a comparison of 
the two – social movements aimed at constitutional amendment 
and social movements aimed at encouraging Congress to enact 
and maintain legislation – is instructive.  Professor Jack Balkin 
illustrates this by offering  an interesting syllogism regarding 
how social movements impact the law.116  He describes the 
suffragist movement as a four-step progression in securing the 
woman’s right to vote: 
(1) Women were citizens. (2) Citizens enjoyed the
privileges and immunities of citizenship, guaranteed by
Article IV and the Fourteenth Amendment.  The privileges
and immunities of citizenship were national in character
and paramount over state authority to the contrary. (3) The
right to vote was one of those privileges and immunities
because without it the United States would not be a country
dedicated to popular sovereignty and governed by its
citizens.  Therefore (4) women had the right to vote.117
Using Professor Balkin’s syllogism as an example, a 
similar syllogism can be used to summarize the progression of 
the social movement supporting wide-spread access to higher 
education and how it resulted in the HEA’s enactment: (1) All 
people deserve to participate fully and meaningfully in 
democratic society;118  (2) This participation requires leveling 
the field for those who have been unable to fully participate in 
society due to their social and economic status;119  (3) Post-
115. See Balkin, supra note 67, at 38-49 for a detailed discussion of the movement 
associated with securing the right to vote for women. 
116. Id. at 42. 
117. Id. 
118. Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 9, at 546, 550.  This 
ideal has been one espoused not only by social movements, but also by politicians over 
time. “If we would prevent the growth of class distinctions and would constantly refresh 
our leadership with the ideals of our people . . . [t]he full opportunity of every boy and girl 
to rise through the selective process of education can alone secure to us this leadership.” 
President Herbert Hoover, Inaugural Address (Mar. 24, 1929), available at 
http://www.hooverpresidentialfoundation.org /inaugural_address.php 
[https://perma.cc/V7P9-ALJL].  
119. Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 9, at 554.
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secondary education has proven to be a path suited  for that 
purpose.120  In fact, over time, the need for a post-secondary 
credential has become significantly pronounced as wage gaps 
continue to expand between the historically underrepresented 
(minority and economically poor) and their historically 
represented counterparts (majority and wealthy);121  (4) 
Therefore, post-secondary education access  should be available 
on a wide-spread basis so that all may have the opportunity to 
obtain a post-secondary credential to assist them in becoming 
fully participating members of society.122 
The history of a social movement’s progression is a rich 
source of information.  It chronicles how the social movement 
formed, how it informed the polity, and the way it advocated for 
enactment of a law that would address a social ill.  Given this, 
courts must consider the social movement history that played a 
significant part in not just enacting the statute, but in setting the 
policy which would sustain it.123 
B. The People’s Will Can Also Be Captured
through Independent Data Collection and Research 
Devices to Assess Public Need and Public Preference in 
Providing that Need 
The people’s will can also be captured through a variety of 
independent data collection devices such as polls, surveys, and 
social science studies that can shed light on the sociological 
impact of agency action.  For instance, data regarding high 
school graduation rates and post-secondary matriculation could 
be recognized in determining whether agency action, with 
regard to the HEA, is thwarting or promoting opportunity to 
120. Id. at 546. 
121. Id. at 549 (citing Marilyn S. Thompson et al., Understanding the Differences in 
Postsecondary Educational Attainment: A comparison of Predictive Measures for Black 
and White Students, 75 J. NEGRO EDUC. 546, 546 (2006)). 
122. Compare Johnson, Going Back to the Drawing Board, supra note 9, at 546, 550 
with Balkin, supra note 67, at 42. 
123. See Balkin, supra note 67, at 27-28 for a list of famous social movements that 
changed constitutional law; but see Balkin, supra note 67, at 27 (“Social movements may 
protest long and loud for recognition of their constitutional claims, but judges are not 
supposed to heed them.  Rather, they are supposed to follow the law, as best they can 
determine what the law is.”).  
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attend and graduate from a post-secondary institution.124  Data 
capturing post-secondary attrition and graduation rates along 
social and economic strata could also provide a lens by which 
the judiciary might review agency action.125  Courts could also 
recognize polls and surveys which capture parents’ and students’ 
attitudes about the value of post-secondary education.126  This 
would be helpful for the judiciary in developing a broader view 
of a rule, how it works, and how it should work according to the 
people’s will.127  Courts could recognize job placement and 
earnings studies that track the earning potential of people with a 
post-secondary credential compared to those without.128  
Focused social science research can also provide information on 
the impact of existing rules and thus project future impact based 
on continuing with a rule or implementing a rule change.129  
This information  creates a broader context for the court and 
creates for it an opportunity to juxtapose the rule’s purported 
impact with the actual impact it has or could  have on the people 
it was created to serve. 
As courts, particularly lower courts, recognize and even 
seek this information, decisions where courts have considered 
the sociological impact of a statute become precedent and thus 
form part of the narrative that all stakeholders use to “explain 
124. Such information may be found on a United States government education
website containing databases featuring information on high school matriculation, attrition, 
and graduation.  See Data Tools, THE NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., 
https://nces.ed.gov/datatools/ [https://perma.cc/HW56-WCLE].  See also Parents Attitudes 
on the Quality of Education in the United States, NORC CTR. FOR PUB. AFF. RES. (2013), 
http://www.apnorc.org/projects/Pages/parents-attitudes-on-the-quality-of-education-in-the-
united-states.aspx [https://perma.cc/GR5S-HCRW], for an example of additional data 
regarding parents’ attitudes on the quality of elementary and secondary education in the 
United States. 
125. See Data Tools, supra note 125.
126. Id.
127. See John Immerwaher, Public Attitudes on Higher Education: A Trend
Analysis, 1993 to 2003, PUB. AGENDA (2004), https://www.publicagenda.org 
/pages/public-attitudes-higher-education [https://perma.cc/4CRW-6E35], for an example of 
a survey analyzing the value parents place on higher education, their concerns about it, 
their beliefs about how social class and access impact the ability to obtain a post-secondary 
credential, etc. 
128. See Thompson, et al., supra note 122 for a discussion of a study focused on 
post-secondary credential earning power, which found that those with a post-secondary 
credential earned more than those without. 
129. See Johnson, Voices, supra note 8 for examples of courts taking notice of social 
science studies describing the social impact of a rule based on constitutional principles. 
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legitimate social change, repudiate past injustices, and justify 
calls for further development.”130  Thus, judicial consideration 
of sociological impact increases the chances that judges will 
reach results that align with the people’s will.  It also ensures 
that sociological impact becomes an integral and normative part 
of agency decision-making and rule promulgation.131 
Using social science to capture sociological impact is not 
without its critics.  Social science research can be both non-
existent on an issue and considered inappropriately used when it 
does exist.132  Scholars note the lack of social science research 
may be due to the judiciary using instruments (social science 
based studies) that are not entirely compatible with the 
instruments it typically uses to review issues.133  For instance, 
social scientists create hypotheses and engage in rigorous data 
collection and analysis to determine if the hypothesis is true or 
true or false.134  “[L]awyers . . .  [, on the other hand,] subscribe 
to the fight theory, which holds that the primary goal is to 
organize facts in a the manner most beneficial to the client.”135  
Because of this, courts are also accused of failing to use social 
science information in the way it should be used.136  
Additionally, critics consider social science research unreliable 
because social scientists can use their knowledge of data 
gathering and analysis to produce results aligned with their own 
values while still labeling their work as objective science.137  
But these potential issues should not discount the use of social 
science by courts.  Just as with any other evidentiary offering, 
the trier of fact can determine accuracy by inquiring about 
130. NeJaime, supra note 50, at 883.
131. Cf. Robert T. Teranishi, Carola Suarez-Orozco and Marcelo Suarez-Orozco,
Immigrants in Community Colleges, 21 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 153, 155 (2011) (describing 
the lack of national database with information on the community college matriculation 
amongst immigrant students).  
132. Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social 
Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REV. 91, 113 (stating that courts 
“might use more social science information if there were more reliable research”).  
133. Id. 
134. See id. at 117-18 (explaining that “[s]ocial science employs an analytical and 
empirical approach to research problems . . . [with many] . . .  goals . . . [including testing] 
a hypothesis of a causal relationship between variables”). 
135. Id. at 118. 
136. Id. at 117. 
137. Rustad and Koenig, supra note 133, at 116.
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research methods.  In fact, recognizing this information at the 
lower court level, instead of introducing it at the final stage of 
litigation in the highest courts, allows the information to be 
vetted more thoroughly.138 
III. IN THE COURTROOM—WHERE IT HAPPENS
The goal here is to propose methods that would include the 
people’s will in the courtroom in a meaningful and sustained 
way.  While courts sometimes  recognize sociological impact, 
this happens most often when weighty and controversial issues 
implicating the constitution are involved.139  “The nation’s 
highest courts have frequently employed judicial notice to 
ensure that its decisions were connected to the society in which 
we operate.”140  But, how does sociological impact address 
judicial review at  lower court levels and when the issue 
involves little “r” rights not granted by the Constitution, but 
secured by entrenched super statutes?  One of the main purposes 
behind super statute entrenchment is to meet the current needs of 
the people without having to engage in the long and protracted 
battle for a constitutional change.141  Addressing the social ill 
plaguing the people through statutory enactment, rather than 
constitutional change, allows a solution to reach the people more 
immediately.142  It also creates a path for the frequent ongoing 
normative debate that shapes the statute to meet the people’s 
needs.143  This shaping often involves the courts as the agency 
administers the statute and as the people engage with it.144  
Thus, the court’s role in this process should not be one that 
ignores all that has transpired in creating and maintaining the 
138. See generally Dorothy F. Easley, Judicial Notice on Appeal: A History Lesson 
in Recent Trends, 84 FLA. B.J. 45, 45 (2010) (“Social and scientific studies have remained 
significant to decisions in major constitutional cases to avoid unjust results.”).   
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law §89 (stating that “contemporaneous
construction is usually applied . . . to constitutions [rather] than to laws . . .” as laws can be 
changed more immediately through legislative means as compared with constitutional 
amendment “which cannot be so readily altered”). 
142. Eskridge and Ferejohn, supra note 56, at 16.
143. Johnson, Voices, supra note 8, at 612. 
144. See id. 
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statute.145  It should be outward looking in terms of discovering 
and taking notice of the people’s will. 
Judicial notice under the Federal Rules of Evidence may 
provide an avenue for including the people’s will in the lower 
level courts as the judiciary reviews agency action.  Federal 
Rule 201 states that: 
The court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to 
reasonable dispute because it (b)(1) is generally known 
within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (b)(2) can 
be accurately and readily determined from sources whose 
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.  The court (c)(1) 
may take judicial notice on its own; or (c)(2) must take 
judicial notice if a party requests it and the court is supplied 
with the necessary information.146 
Judicial notice reduces the burden on judges in finding 
facts by allowing judges to recognize facts that are common 
knowledge.147  While the judiciary has frequently taken notice of 
social and scientific research, this has happened mostly at the 
United States Supreme Court level.  This practice should be 
expanded such that courts reviewing agency action, at all levels, 
can take judicial notice of the sociological impact of an agency’s 
decision or rule.  This ensures that the people’s voice will be in 
the courtroom when agency action is under review.  It also 
ensures efficiency in producing court decisions that reflect the 
people’s will.  In this way, the relative immediacy that an 
entrenched super statute provides, in terms of change to address 
the people’s needs, is not lost.148 
CONCLUSION 
When the DOE acts pursuant to the HEA, the people ought 
to have a real and influencing opportunity to have their voices 
heard.  They must be, or at least their voices must be, in the 
room where it happens.  That’s not just in the voting booth, the 
offices of negotiated rule-making sessions, or through notice and 
comment procedures.  These devices have their place in the 
145. Id. at 621 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483. 491 (1954)).
146. FED. R. EVID. 201(b)-(c).
147. Easley, supra note 139, at 45.
148. See Eskridge and Ferejohn, supra note 56, at 16.
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normative debate that shapes a law, but they cannot be the whole 
of what constitutes the people’s will when reviewing agency 
action for alignment.  Courts must hear the people’s will through 
social movement history, research, studies, and other devises. 
That stakeholders find themselves in court means that normal 
communication and approaches to problem solving have broken 
down.149  It is the courts that, from a position of involvement 
and not neutrality, are positioned to help the stakeholders find a 
solution that aligns with the people’s will. 
149. Johnson, Voices, supra note 8, at 622.
